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ABSTRACT
In much of the world, growth is more stable than it once was. Looking at a sample of twentyfive
countries, we find that in sixteen, real GDP growth is less volatile today than it was twenty years ago.
And these declines are large, averaging more than fifty per cent. What accounts for the fact that real
growth has been more stable in recent years? We survey the evidence and competing explanations
and find support for the view that improved inventory management policies, coupled with financial
innovation, adopting an inflation targeting scheme and increased central bank independence have
all been associated with more stable real growth. Furthermore, we find weak evidence suggesting
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1. Introduction 
 
Today the world’s economies appear to be much calmer than they were just a quarter-century 
ago.  At the beginning of the 1980s, nearly two-thirds of the countries in the world were 
experiencing inflation in excess of 10 per cent per year.   Today, it is one in six.  Growth has 
risen as well.  Two decades ago nearly one country in three was contracting.  Today, five in six 
countries are growing at a rate in excess of 2 per cent per year.
1   But this is not the end of the 
story.  Not only is inflation lower and output higher, they both appear to be more stable.  The 
question is why. 
 
Declines in the level and volatility of inflation are not that much of a mystery.  The answer is 
almost surely better policy.  Substantial changes in the operational framework of central banks 
over the past few decades have produced better inflation outcomes.  Increased independence, as 
well as improved accountability and transparency have all played a role.
2  In an earlier paper, we 
find that improved monetary policy has been the driving force behind the better economic 
performance of the past decade.
3  But there we focus on weighted averages of output and 
inflation variability, and usually on cases in which inflation variability has a relatively high 
weight.  Concluding that low and stable inflation is a consequence of better monetary policy is, 
therefore, not a big surprise. 
 
In this paper we move to an examination of the output volatility alone. Using techniques 
pioneered by McConnell and Perez Quiros (2000) in their study of United States GDP, we 
confirm the basic finding that the volatility of output growth has declined.
4  In fact, it has fallen 
in 16 of the 25 countries we study – it is unchanged in 9.  And on average, for the countries in 
which it fell, the standard deviation of innovations to output growth has been cut in half.  But, as 
we will discuss in more detail, the timing of the decline in volatility is far from synchronized.  
  
                                                 
1 All of these numbers are computed from the International Monetary Fund’s World Economic Outlook database. 
2 For a detailed discussion of these issues see Cecchetti and Krause (2001 and 2002). 
3 See Cecchetti, Flores-Lagunes, and Krause (April 2006, forthcoming). 
4 For the U.S., the fact that the volatility of GDP growth has fallen since 1984 has been confirmed by virtually 
everyone who has looked at the data.  See, for example, Nelson and Kim (1999), Stock and Watson (2002), and 
Ahmed, Levin and Wilson (2002). Cecchetti, Flores-Lagunes and Krause    The Volatility of Real Growth 
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Documenting the fact that the world has become more stable is only the first step.  We go on to 
survey various possible explanations.  There are five major ones:  
(1) Improved inventory management policies; cited by McConnell, Mosser, and Perez 
Quiros (1999), McConnell and Perez Quiros (2000), Kahn, McConnell, and Perez 
Quiros (2002), and McConnell and Kahn (2005);  
(2) Better monetary policy as discussed in Clarida, Galí and Gertler (2000), and our 
previous work;  
(3) Financial innovation and improvements in risk sharing, as discussed in Dynan, 
Elmendorf and Sichel (2005); 
(4) Increased international commercial openness, as suggested in Barrell and Gottschalk 
(2004). 
(5) Luck in the form of smaller shocks, the answer given by both Ahmed, Levin and 
Wilson (2002) and Stock and Watson (2002). 
 
Additional explanations include the change in the composition of output, away from more 
volatile manufacturing and toward more stable services, and that reduced volatility is a 
consequence of changes in the methods used to construct the data. 
 
The evidence is broadly consistent with improved inventory policy accounting for some portion 
of the decline in all 12 countries where we have the appropriate data.  The better monetary policy 
hypothesis fares substantially worse, accounting for declines in output volatility in 10 of the 24 
countries for which we have results.  This is unsurprising given the fact that monetary policy 
faces a tradeoff between inflation and output volatility, and that in the past two decades we have 
witnessed a dramatic shift towards keeping inflation low and stable.  
 
While we have something to say about the implications of increased openness, our focus is 
primarily on the likely impact of financial innovation.  To foreshadow our conclusions, we find 
that the volatility of output falls as a country’s financial system becomes more developed and its 
central bank becomes more independent.  Volatility fell by more in countries where credit 
became more readily available.   Furthermore, we find weak evidence that more commercial Cecchetti, Flores-Lagunes and Krause    The Volatility of Real Growth 
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openness, as measured by the ratio of imports plus exports to GDP, is negatively correlated with 
volatility across countries. 
 
The remainder of the paper is divided into four parts.  In Section 2 we outline the econometric 
testing procedures used to identify breaks in the volatility of output growth, and then report the 
results for both the timing and size of the changes in volatility.  Section 3 presents a discussion 
of the numerous candidate explanations for the changes in output volatility, and Section 4 
presents the second stage of our empirical analysis, where we present evidence in an attempt to 
distinguish them. Section 5 summarises our conclusions. Unfortunately, our analysis is 
sufficiently crude that we are only able to establish a set of correlations that are suggestive of 
which way to go next. 
 
2. Identifying and Estimating the Changing Volatility of Growth 
 
We begin our analysis by looking for structural breaks in the volatility of GDP growth.  We do 
this in a series of steps.  First, we estimate an equation of the form 
(1) Δyt = μ + ρΔyt-1 + εt 
where yt is the log of real GDP or the price level, Δ indicates the first difference, μ is a constant, 
ρ is a parameter representing the persistence of GDP growth, and ε is an innovation that is 
independent over time, but need not be identically distributed.  Equation (1) is estimated 
allowing for breaks in the mean and persistence of output growth.
5   
 
The result of this first step is a series of estimated residuals,  ˆt ε .  As noted by McConnell and 
Perez Quiros (2000), the transformed residuals,  2 ˆ || t
π ε , are unbiased estimators of the standard 
deviation of εt.  Using these, we proceed to the second step, which is to search for breaks in an 
equation of the following form: 
 
(2)  2 ˆ || t
π ε  = α + ut. 
                                                 
5 Our primary results use the first-difference of deviations of log GDP from its HP-filtered trend.  This is exactly 
analogous to removing a time-varying mean.    Cecchetti, Flores-Lagunes and Krause    The Volatility of Real Growth 
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That is, we look for breaks in the mean (α) of scaled absolute value of the estimated residuals 
from the simple regression (1), after allowing for the possibility of structural breaks in μ and ρ. 
(The details of the econometric procedures, which require a number of decisions, are described 
in a technical appendix.) 
 
 
We examine shifts in the volatility of growth in 25 countries.  Briefly, we begin by taking first-
difference of deviations of the log of real GDP from an HP-filtered trend, then look for breaks in 
persistence, and conditional on those search from breaks in volatility. This is exactly equivalent 
to studying the deviations of growth from a time-varying mean. Where available, we use 
quarterly data starting in 1970.
6 The results for this exercise are reported in Table 2.1.  First, note 
that we identify at least one break in persistence for 10 of the 25 countries, with two breaks for 
two countries. We then find at least one break in volatility in all but nine countries (Austria, 
Belgium, Chile, France, Japan, Mexico, Norway, Peru and Switzerland), and two breaks in six of 
the 25 countries we study (Netherlands, New Zealand, South Africa, Spain, Sweden and the 
United Kingdom). We allow for as many as five breaks, but in no country do we find more than 
two. While our dating of the breaks suggests that persistence and volatility often change 
simultaneously within a country, these dates are not synchronized across countries. Of the total 
of 22 breaks in volatility that we identify, only one takes place in the 1970s, 12 are in the 1980s, 
and another 9 are in the 1990s.
7  
                                                 
6 Our results are robust to the use of unfiltered GDP growth, assuming that we allow for breaks in the mean growth 
rate, μ  in equation (1), before testing for breaks in persistence. 
7 Our results are consistent with the timing of breaks identified by Smith and Summers (2002), who study Australia, 
Canada, Germany, Japan and the UK.  Cecchetti, Flores-Lagunes and Krause    The Volatility of Real Growth 
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Table 2.1:  Timing of Breaks in Persistence  
and Volatility of GDP Growth 
Persistence Volatility 




Austria none    none   
Belgium none    none   
Canada 1980Q4
*   1987Q2
***  
Chile none    none   
Denmark none    1994Q3
***  
Finland none    1995Q2
*   
France none    none   
Germany none    1993Q3
***  
Greece none    1991Q1
***  
Israel none    1985Q2
**  
Italy 1979Q4
**   1983Q3
***  
Japan none    none   
South Korea  1992Q2









New Zealand  none    1975Q3
* 1987Q3
*** 
Norway none    none   
Peru none    none   














***   none   
United Kingdom  none    1981Q2
*** 1991Q4
*** 
United States  none    1984Q2
***  
Source:  Breaks are estimated using the first-difference of deviations of log GDP from 
an HP-filtered trend, conditional on possible breaks in persistence. See the Appendix 
for details.  All sample periods end in 2003Q4. Sample period begins in 1970 for all 
countries except Austria (1976), Belgium (1980), Chile (1980), Denmark (1978), 
Finland (1975), Israel (1980), Mexico (1980), the Netherlands (1977), Peru (1980), and 
Switzerland (1972). 
 
***: Significant at the 1% level 
**:   Significant at the 5% level 
*:     Significant at the 10% level 
 
Figure 2.1 plots the volatility of output before and after the estimated break dates. Volatility 
declined for all countries for which we identified a single break. There was also a steady decline 
in output volatility in five of the countries for which we identified two breaks (Netherlands, New Cecchetti, Flores-Lagunes and Krause    The Volatility of Real Growth 
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Zealand, Sweden, South Africa and the UK and South Africa), while Spain experienced an 
increase in volatility after the first break, and then a decline following the second break. None of 
the countries experienced an increase in the standard deviation of growth in the last period as 
compared to the first. Across all countries, the declines ranged from just over 10 per cent for 
Spain to almost 80 per cent for New Zealand (combining the 2 breaks). The average decline from 
the beginning to the end of each country’s sample wais close to 50 per cent.  In other words, 
these are not small numbers. 
 
Figure 2.1:  Output Volatility before and after  
Estimated Structural Breaks in Volatility 
 
Estimated standard deviation of the real output growth (measured as deviations from HP filtered trend) before and after 
estimated break dates, conditional on breaks in persistence. 
 
3. Explaining the Decline in the Volatility of Growth 
Previous authors have delineated five possible explanations for the observed decline in output 
volatility.  These include shifts to just-in-time inventory control methods, improvements in 
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summarise each of these, together with a discussion of some of the evidence drawn from the US 
case.  In the next section, we explore the possible explanations for the cross-country declines in 
volatility documented in the previous section. 
 
Before getting started, there are two hypotheses that we do not investigate or discuss:  That the 
change in the variability of growth is a result of changes in fiscal policy or that it is an artefact of 
a change in data construction techniques.  Both of these have been dismissed in the US case (see 
the appendix to Dynan, Elmendorf, and Sichel (2005) for a summary).  Data construction 
techniques have not changed all that markedly in the past 30 years and there is little evidence 
that the stabilising ability of fiscal policy has improved.
8  This still leaves a set of five possible 
explanations.  
 
3.1 Changes in Inventory Control Policies 
 
Inventory changes account for a very small portion of GDP, averaging about ½ per cent and 
rarely exceeding 1 per cent of the total; they account for virtually none of trend growth. Even so, 
changes in private inventories account for something like 20 per cent of the volatility in quarterly 
GDP growth.  From 1959 to 2003 the standard deviation of quarterly US total GDP growth, 
measured at a quarterly rate, was approximately 1 percentage point.  Excluding inventory 
changes, this falls to 0.8 percentage points.   
 
Given the importance of inventories in aggregate fluctuations, changes in inventory management 
policies could easily have an impact on the volatility of GDP.  Improvements in technology that 
allow flexible production, smaller batch sizes, better monitoring of real-time sales, and the like 
have created substantial opportunities for reduced volatility.  Today, an automobile assembly 
plant keeps only a few hours worth of parts on hand – the rest are in transit to the factory, timed 
to arrive at just the right moment.  Similarly, a supermarket or superstore like Wal-Mart or 
                                                 
8 We note, but do not investigate, the possibility that fiscal consolidations had an impact on the financial system, 
leaving it freer to accommodate private credit needs. Cecchetti, Flores-Lagunes and Krause    The Volatility of Real Growth 
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Target will hold only one to two days’ supply of most products.  The result is a great deal of 
flexibility in responding to changes in demand and sales.
9 
 
McConnell and Perez Quiros (2000), Kahn, McConnell and Perez Quiros (2002), and Kahn and 
McConnell (2005) marshal evidence in support of the view that changes in inventory 
management policies are the source of output’s increased stability.  They begin by noting that the 
volatility of output growth in the durable goods sector has fallen dramatically, and go on to note 
that the variance of final sales growth has not.  McConnell and co-authors then show that 
inventory levels have fallen noticeably, and that the decline was most pronounced in the mid-
1980s.
10  This is clearly consistent with the results in Table 3.1,which provides an accounting of 




                                                 
9 Recent press reports suggest that these large retailers have gone even further, no longer holding their store 
inventories on their own books. For example, a tube of Procter and Gamble produced toothpaste on a Wal-Mart 
store shelf will be on Procter and Gamble’s books until it is sold to the final consumer.  Only when they are sold, 
does Wal-Mart actually pay for the items that are in their stores.  This change in accounting has the potential to drive 
reported retail inventories to very low levels, as well as reducing the volatility of measured inventories 
10 Ramey and Vine (2004b) take issue with the inventory-sales ratio evidence used by Kahn, McConnell, and Perez-
Quiros (2002), noting that the drop seen in the nominal data are not mirrored in the real data.  That is, when looking 
at the ratio of real, deflated, inventories to real sales, the drop emphasized by Kahn et. al is no longer apparent. Cecchetti, Flores-Lagunes and Krause    The Volatility of Real Growth 
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Table 3.1: Accounting for the Changes in the  
Variance of Real Growth 
 






of the two 
 Consumption      
  Durable goods  0.04  0.69  0.28 
  Nondurable goods  0.03  0.86  0.11 
  Services  0.03  0.88  0.09 
 Investment      
    Nonresidential  0.03  0.74  0.24 
    Residential  0.06  0.83  0.11 
    Change in private inventories  0.35  0.54  0.12 
Net exports  0.05 1.16  -0.20 
Government  0.05 0.94  0.00 
  Federal  0.04  1.00  -0.04 
  State & Local  0.01  0.94  0.05 
      
 1959-1983  1984-2003  Decline 
Variance of Real GDP  1.23 0.30  0.93 
The table shows the decomposition of the change in the variance of GDP from 1959-1983 and 
1984-2003 into the variance of each component (individually) the variance of the GDP excluding 
the component and twice the covariance of the two.  Each row sums to 1.0.  Data on real GDP are 
constructed by splicing chained 1952, 1972, 1982 and 2000 series, component by component, 
Table 1.1.6, 1.1.6B, 1.1.6C, and 1.1.6D; all data are from www.bea.gov/bea/dn/home/gdp.htm. 
 
The standard deviation of quarterly real GDP growth (measured at a quarterly rate) dropped by 
0.56 percentage points, from 1.11 to 0.55.  Table 3.1 examines the decomposition of the variance 
of quarterly real GDP growth (which fell from 1.23 to 0.30) into the portion that can be 
accounted for by various components.  Arithmetically, the fall in the variance in GDP can be a 
consequence of the change in the variance of an individual component, the change in the 
variance of GDP excluding that component, or the change in (twice) the covariance of the 
component and GDP excluding the component.  Each of row of the table shows the fraction of 
the change of the variance accounted for by each of these.  To see which components matter, 
look for rows in which the first column is big and the second column is far from 1.  Inventories 
have that property. Looking at the covariances, we see that there is a role for residential 
construction and durable goods as well. 
 Cecchetti, Flores-Lagunes and Krause    The Volatility of Real Growth 
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Cross-country comparisons point in the same direction.  Table 3.2 reports the change in GDP 
volatility and the change in the volatility of the contribution to growth
11 attributable to inventory 
accumulation for a subset of fourteen countries in our sample.
12  In all twelve cases, the decline 
in the standard deviation of the contribution of inventory changes to GDP growth is large.  
Furthermore, it is usually a substantial fraction of the overall decline in volatility growth, 
accounting, on average, for nearly 60 per cent of the decline in output growth volatility across 
countries.   
Table 3.2 The Changing Volatility of Inventory Accumulation 
Standard Deviation of 
Quarterly GDP Growth at 
Quarterly Rate 
Standard Deviation of Growth 
Contribution from Inventories 
Accumulation  Country
















  1974Q3  1984Q3 1.34 0.69 0.65 0.92 0.73 0.19 
Canada
  1979Q1  1987Q2 1.05 0.65 0.41 0.78 0.59 0.19 
Denmark
  1978Q1  1994Q3 1.20 0.67 0.53 1.59 0.96 0.64 
Germany  1970Q1  1993Q3 1.78 0.56 1.22 0.73 0.48 0.25 
Italy  1970Q1  1983Q3 1.09 0.64 0.45 1.06 0.86 0.20 
Korea  1970Q1  1980Q3 2.39 1.69 0.70 1.38 0.88 0.50 
Netherlands  1983Q4  1994Q3 0.86 0.57 0.29 1.14 0.65 0.49 
New Zealand
  1975Q3  1987Q3 3.41 1.18 2.23 1.85 1.03 0.82 
Spain  1985Q2  1993Q2 1.24 0.46 0.77 1.16 0.88 0.28 
Sweden  1984Q3  1993Q1 0.95 0.43 0.52 0.92 0.81 0.11 
United  Kingdom  1981Q2  1991Q4 0.73 0.36 0.37 0.81 0.49 0.32 
United  States  1970Q1  1984Q2 1.20 0.51 0.69 0.55 0.37 0.18 
For countries in which there are two breaks, the “Beginning of Sample” is the date of the first break.  
Source: OECD Economic Outlook No. 76, December 2004.  Changes in inventories are the series labeled “Stockbuilding”.  
Real GDP is volume data at market prices. All data are real, seasonally adjusted. Break dates are determined by the procedure 
described in the text, using the first difference of the HP-filtered log of GDP, starting in 1970. 
 
The natural interpretation of these results has a potential flaw arising from the possibility that the 
increased stability of inventories could be a consequence of more stable demand.  When demand 
is stable (because either shocks are smaller or monetary policy is conducted more efficiently), 
firms see less reason to hold inventories.   With smaller shocks overall, everything will be 
                                                 
11 Computationally, it is the growth of the component times the (lagged) share of that component in GDP.  So, for 
example, if service consumption were to grow by 5 per cent, since it accounts for 40 per cent of total GDP, its 
growth contribution would be 5x0.4=2 per cent. 
12 We report results for all countries that both exhibit at least one break in volatility and for which the OECD reports 
inventory data. Cecchetti, Flores-Lagunes and Krause    The Volatility of Real Growth 
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smoother.
13  This argument is the centerpiece of the work of Herrera and Pesavento 
(forthcoming), who find that the volatility of both inventories and shipments has declined.    
 
3.2 Better Monetary Policy 
 
The second candidate explanation for the decreased volatility of output growth is that it is a 
result of improved monetary policy.  Beginning in the mid-1980s, the structure of central banks 
changed in many parts of the world. There was an increase in independence and transparency, as 
well as a new-found commitment to low, stable inflation.  And, as central bankers often 
emphasise, price stability is the foundation for high growth.  In other words, inflation is bad for 
growth. 
 
Today economists have a much better understanding of how to implement monetary policy than 
they did as recently as twenty years ago.  To succeed in keeping inflation low and stable while at 
the same time keeping real growth high and stable, central bankers must focus on adjusting real 
interest rates either when inflation differs from its target level and/or when output deviates from 
potential output. 
 
There are several pieces of evidence supporting the view that improved macroeconomic 
outcomes can be traced to better monetary policy.  For the case of the US, Clarida, Galí and 
Gertler (2000) show that the actions of the 1970s implied a policy reaction curve, or Taylor rule, 
in which inflation increases were met with insufficiently aggressive nominal interest rate 
increases.  Under Chairman Arthur Burns, when inflation went up, the Federal Reserve increased 
their policy-controlled interest rate by less than one for one, so the real interest rate went down.  
The result was instability – both in inflation and output growth. 
 
In an earlier paper, Cecchetti, Flores-Lagunes and Krause (April 2006, forthcoming), we develop 
a method for measuring the contribution of improved monetary policy to observed changes in 
macroeconomic performance and then use it to explain the observed increase in macroeconomic 
stability in a cross-section of countries. Our technique involves examining changes in the 
                                                 
13 For a discussion see Ramey and Vines (2004a). Cecchetti, Flores-Lagunes and Krause    The Volatility of Real Growth 
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variability of inflation and output over time. We estimate a simple macroeconomic model of 
inflation and output for each of 24 countries, and use it to construct an output-inflation variability 
efficiency frontier. Specifically, for each country we specify the dynamics of inflation and output 
as a function of the interest rate – our measure of the central bank policy instrument – and some 
additional exogenous variables. Using the estimated model, we are able to compute the output-
inflation variability frontier describing the best possible outcomes that a policymaker can hope to 
achieve.  Movements toward this frontier are interpreted as improvements in monetary policy 
efficiency.  Our estimates suggest that improved monetary policy has played an increased 
stabilising role in 21 of the 24 countries (even though the comparison is between a base period – 
1983-1990 – when many observers believe monetary policy had already greatly improved in 
many countries).
14 Seventeen countries experienced reduced supply shock variability, but overall 
this had a modest impact on performance. 
 
Table 3.3 is derived from the results in that paper.  However, in the current exercise we assume 
that the sole objective of monetary policy is to focus on output stability. The columns labelled 
“Output volatility, actual” report the observed decline in the volatility of output growth 
(measured using industrial production) from the 1980s to the 1990s.  Output volatility fell in 14 
of the 24 cases.  Next, in the columns labelled “Output volatility, minimising,” the table reports 
the minimum attainable variance of output computed from an estimated structural model.  This is 
the best performance that could have obtained if policymakers focused all of their attention on 
output stabilisation (and none on inflation stabilisation).  In all but six of these cases, the best 
attainable outcome was lower output volatility in the second period, so innovation variances fell 
– this reflects either some “good luck” (that is, smaller shocks) or the presence of favourable 
structural changes that reduced the effect of shocks in the economy.  The difference between 
these two – the change in actual minus the change in minimal output volatility – is a measure of 
policy effectiveness. We do not report this difference to simplify the table presentation.  The 
final column shows the proportion of the volatility change that can be attributed to policy; a 
negative number here implies that policy contributed to an increase in output volatility. 
 
                                                 
14 In the cases of Austria, Germany, and Switzerland we find that monetary policy contributed to increased 
volatility.  This is likely a consequence of a combination of events including the fiscal and monetary consequence or 
German unification and the preparations for creation of the European Monetary Union. Cecchetti, Flores-Lagunes and Krause    The Volatility of Real Growth 
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due to Better 
Policy 
Australia  5.49 2.21 3.28 2.19 0.53 1.66  0.49 
Austria  5.41 8.80  -3.39  0.51 2.03  -1.52  -0.55 
Belgium  4.05 6.19  -2.14  1.63 2.48  -0.85  -0.60 
Canada  8.20 5.76 2.44 2.12 0.56 1.56  0.36 
Chile  68.29 14.02 54.27 26.27  3.38 22.90  0.58 
Denmark  7.53 7.19 0.34 3.87 3.11 0.75  -1.23 
Finland  5.69 11.94  -6.25 1.46  1.52 -0.06  -0.99 
France  2.62 4.31  -1.69  0.61 1.75  -1.14  -0.33 
Germany  3.99 6.82  -2.83  1.51 1.05 0.46  -1.16 
Greece  5.47 1.99 3.48 3.34 1.13 2.21  0.36 
Ireland  12.90 8.34 4.56 3.85  4.07 -0.22  1.05 
Israel  9.20 4.49 4.71 3.56 1.14 2.42  0.49 
Italy  3.29 5.34  -2.06  1.77 0.41 1.35  -1.66 
Japan  14.80 9.08 5.73 0.82  1.94 -1.12  1.20 
Korea  21.83 16.53 5.30  8.46  4.69  3.77  0.29 
Mexico  9.20 16.11  -6.91 3.97  2.94 1.03  -1.15 
Netherlands  4.38 3.23 1.15 2.37 1.09 1.28  -0.12 
New Zealand  13.83 10.92 2.91  6.31  2.38  3.94  -0.35 
Portugal  7.89 16.97  -9.08 3.72  3.22 0.50  -1.06 
Spain  3.03 8.54  -5.52  1.90 0.84 1.06  -1.19 
Sweden  5.69 12.73  -7.04 4.07  3.25 0.82  -1.12 
Switzerland  10.15 4.98 5.17 5.09  2.94 2.15  0.58 
U.K.  3.64 2.90 0.74 1.38 0.38 1.00  -0.36 
U.S.  4.10 1.75 2.35 1.24 0.17 1.07  0.54 
Source:  Computed using techniques described in Cecchetti, Flores-Lagunes, and Krause (forthcoming).  Actual 
output volatility is computed from standard deviation of the growth in deviations of log industrial production for an 
HP-filtered trend.  Column labeled “Proportion of Improved Performance due to Better Policy” is the ratio 
of the (Change in the Actual – Change in the optimal) divided by the Change in the Actual. 
 
Overall, the results suggest that policy was a stabilizing force in only 10 of the 24 countries.  In 
the remaining 14, the contribution of policy was to increase the volatility of output.  This should 
come as no surprise since, as we show in our other paper, the primary impact of policy during 
this period was to stabilize inflation.  By focusing on inflation stability, policymakers moved 
along an output-inflation volatility frontier and made output more volatile, not less.    Cecchetti, Flores-Lagunes and Krause    The Volatility of Real Growth 
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It is worth emphasizing that it is likely to be very difficult to distinguish better policy decisions 
from a better institutional environment, regardless of the actual macroeconomic outcomes.  As 
two of us discuss in Cecchetti and Krause (2001), the acumen of policymakers is irrelevant if 
they are operating in an institutional environment in which monetary policy is ineffective. There 
are a number of examples of changes that improve the ability of policymakers’ actions to 
influence inflation and output.  The traditional ones include the degree of a central bank’s 
political independence and the implementation of explicit inflation targeting regimes.  As noted 
by Krause and Méndez (2005), these sorts of institutional changes, as well as membership of the 
European Monetary Union, are associated with higher relative preference for inflation stability.  




Changes in financial structure can also influence the efficacy of monetary policy.  For example, 
movements away from a government controlled banking system can result in improved 
macroeconomic outcomes that are likely to be indistinguishable from those that come from 
improved policymaking itself.  With that in mind, we now turn to a discussion of changes in the 
financial system.  
 
3.3 Financial Innovation 
 
Dynan, Elmendorf, and Sichel (2005) provide a detailed discussion of the potential link between 
the decline in the volatility of US GDP growth and American financial innovations of the 1980s.  
These include the development of active secondary markets for loans (especially for home 
mortgages), the increased popularity of junk bonds, the phasing out of deposit interest-rate 
controls, regulatory changes aimed at creating access to credit for low-income households, and 
the eventual elimination of the prohibition on interstate banks. 
 
                                                 
15 Cecchetti and Ehrmann (2002) find modest evidence that inflation targeting countries experience slightly higher 
output volatility than non-inflation targeting countries. Cecchetti, Flores-Lagunes and Krause    The Volatility of Real Growth 
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The case of home mortgages provides an excellent example.  Prior to the mid-1980s, households 
wishing to borrow for the purpose of purchasing a home had to obtain financing from a local 
financial intermediary.  This meant that they were reliant on the ability of bankers to obtain 
sufficient deposit liabilities to provide the loan.  If funds were plentiful in one locale, but scarce 
in another, there was no way for the funding to flow to where it was needed.  The creation of 
asset-backed securities changed all of this. 
 
In 1970, Government National Mortgage Association (GNMA) issued the first mortgage-backed 
securities. These were pass-through securities composed of government guaranteed mortgages.   
The Federal National Mortgage Association (FNMA) then issued mortgage-backed securities 
backed by private insurance in 1981. Because of prepayment uncertainties, these initial asset-
backed securities had durations that could not be computed with confidence.  This problem was 
solved in 1983 when Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation (FHLMC) issued the first 
tranched collateralized mortgage obligations (CMOs).  CMOs divided the pool of mortgages into 
maturity categories based on when they are prepaid, and reduced the prepayment risk.  The result 
was a very liquid mortgage market. McCarthy and Peach (2002) provide a detailed discussion of 
these changes to the U.S. mortgage market, and find that it has damped the response of 
residential fixed investment to changes in monetary policy.   
 
Today, mortgages are just the tip of the asset-backed security iceberg.  With the exception of 
certain types of small-business loans, virtually every type of credit is securitised.  This includes 
commercial and industrial loans, credit-card debt, student loans, and motor vehicle loans.  The 
last provide another interesting example. In early 2005 the business news reported the 
downgrading of US motor vehicle manufacturers.  For example, Moody’s and Standard and 
Poor’s lowered General Motors long-term credit rating to the lowest investment grade level.  At 
the same time, asset-backed car loans were receiving triple-A ratings.   The default rate on these 
loans is predictable, so pools have very little risk in them. 
 
All of this has come along with a dramatic increase in the use of debt by both households and 
businesses.  Individuals can better smooth consumption in the face of short-term income 
variation, while firms can invest more steadily, even when faced with transitory revenue Cecchetti, Flores-Lagunes and Krause    The Volatility of Real Growth 
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fluctuations.
16  Overall, risk is able to flow to those best able to bear it, thereby increasing the 
efficiency of the economy as a whole. 
 
The improved ability of financial markets to efficiently distribute risk is consistent with Comin 
and Philippon’s (2005) observation that firm level volatility has risen even as aggregate volatility 
has fallen.  In a world with poorly functioning financial markets, high transactions costs make it 
costly for investors to obtain diversified portfolios.  As a result, they will push firms to diversify 
internally, creating large conglomerates like General Electric.  GE produces everything from 
light bulbs to power generating plants, jet engines, and financial services.  Diversification of this 
sort reduces the risk of the enterprise as a whole and is surely good for the managers of GE.  And 
if financial transaction costs are high, it is good for investors, too.  But as financial markets 
become deeper and more liquid, investors will prefer to choose their own portfolio weights for 
the different sectors, and there will be a push toward smaller firms with more volatility.  At the 
same time, aggregate volatility will fall. 
 
Returning to the case of households, Figure 3.1 provides some evidence that debt has improved 
the ability of households to smooth consumption in the face of income shocks. The figure plots 
the ratio of total American household debt to personal income (the grey line on the right-hand 
scale) together with the backward-looking five year rolling standard deviation of consumption 
growth (the black line on the left-hand scale). These two series clearly have trends, but if we 
look at the changes we see that a 10 percentage point increase in the ratio of debt to income was 
associated with a decline of 50 basis points (0.5) in consumption volatility over the following 5 
years. That is, the impact is economically meaningful. 
17   While we make no attempt to prove 
that increased debt has caused consumption to be smoother, we note that many of the legal and 
regulatory changes that allowed financial innovations to occur during the late 1980s and 1990s 
seem independent of consumption growth.  
 
                                                 
16 Campbell and Hercowitz (2005) link the reduced volatility of output to the increase in household borrowing 
resulting from the relaxation of collateral constraints in the 1980s.  They point to increases in the availability of 
home equity loans as a potentially important source of an individual’s ability to smooth consumption in the face of 
income volatility. 
17 The t-statistic for the coefficient in a regression of the change in consumption volatility on the debt-to-income 
ratio is -1.7. Cecchetti, Flores-Lagunes and Krause    The Volatility of Real Growth 
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Figure plots the ratio of average total household debt, including mortgages and consumer credit, to personal income 
(gray line) and the standard deviation of quarterly real consumption growth at an annual rate over the next five years 
(black) line).  
 
Sources:  Flow of Funds Accounts from the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and Bureau of 
Economic Analysis of the Department of Commerce.  
 
3.4 International Openness 
 
Over the last half of the twentieth century, trade barriers were reduced or eliminated worldwide 
and transportation costs plummeted.  The result has been a dramatic increase in the amount of 
cross-border trade in goods and services.  In the US, for example, the ratio of imports plus 
exports to GDP has risen from just over 10 percent in 1970 to 26 per cent today.  Something 
similar has happened worldwide, with this measure of openness rising from 23 per cent in 1970 
to 54 per cent in 2004.
18   With moves like the elimination of the multi-fibre agreement at the 
beginning of 2005, we can expect this trend to continue.  More trade has also brought with it 
increased financial transactions.  Current and capital account flows have both risen. 
                                                 
18 These are the IMF World Economic Outlook aggregates. Cecchetti, Flores-Lagunes and Krause    The Volatility of Real Growth 
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Greater commercial and financial openness can affect aggregate volatility in a number of ways. 
First, it provides an opportunity for international risk sharing – both purely financial and real.  
On the financial side, in the same way that mortgage financing in the US does not have to come 
from the geographic home of the borrower, now financing can come from outside a country.
19  
Households, firms, and governments in one country now have access to funds from elsewhere in 
the world.   In the same way, demand for real goods and services comes both from inside and 
outside a country.  As the importance of trade flows increases, fluctuations in domestic aggregate 
demand become less important for domestic production. 
 
A second mechanism by which openness can lower volatility is by allowing developed countries 
to send their more volatile industries off shore.
20  A developed country that is able to push its 
volatile manufacturing sector into the less-developed world will have a more stable domestic 
economy.  As it turns out, this seems an unlikely explanation;  the shift from goods to services in 
the US accounts for virtually none of the fall in the volatility of real growth. 
 
These arguments also imply that larger countries could be more stable just because they are 
better diversified. Smaller economies, which are typically more open, may be more susceptible 
to certain shocks, given that their economic structure is more likely to be concentrated in a few 
industries. The result could be more, not less volatility.  Emerging market countries that are more 
open are more exposed to the impact of shocks arising from events like the Asian crisis of 1997.  
In the end, commercial openness could either raise or lower output volatility. We provide modest 
evidence for the former in the next section of the paper. 
 
3.5 Smaller Shocks  
 
A number of authors conclude that improved macroeconomic performance, especially in the US, 
is a consequence of smaller shocks.  Ahmed, Levin, and Wilson (2002) and Stock and Watson 
(2002) provide the most detailed arguments for this case.  Their results are based on the 
                                                 
19 In their study of 24 OECD countries, Buch, Döpke, and Pierdzioch (2002) find that business cycles are less 
pronounced in countries with more open financial markets.  
20 This would not lower volatility globally.  Unfortunately, we do not have data to test this hypothesis. Cecchetti, Flores-Lagunes and Krause    The Volatility of Real Growth 
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following logic.  Any stochastic model of the economy can be thought of as combining some 
shocks with a propagation mechanism.  If output volatility has declined it is either a consequence 
of a change in the nature of shocks or a change in the propagation mechanism.  Both sets of 
authors are unable to find changes in the later, so they ascribe the observed stabilisation of the 
real economy to the former.
21 
 
There are a number of issues that arise in evaluating the case for luck.  First, there is casual 
empirical evidence against it. It is difficult to argue that the stability of the 1990s was mere good 
fortune.  Surely, the decade was not a calm one for the financial markets.  Major economic crises 
occurred in Latin America and Asia, and Long-Term Capital Management nearly collapsed, 
paralysing the bond markets.  Raw materials prices fluctuated wildly.  The price of oil spiked at 
more than US$35 a barrel late in 1990, then plunged below US$12 a barrel at the end of 1998 
before beginning a steady rise to US$30 a barrel by the beginning of 2000. 
 
Second, the observation that the shocks hitting the economy have been effectively smaller is 
completely consistent with the view that stabilisation has been a consequence of improved 
monetary policy.  One possibility, and the one consistent with the previous discussion, is that 
central bankers have both created smaller shocks of their own and succeeded in neutralizing the 
shocks that they have seen.  The Clarida, Galí and Gertler result is clearly of the first type.  Their 
finding that policymakers engaged in destabilising behaviour is consistent with the idea that 
central bankers were exacerbating, rather than ameliorating, shocks.  In standard econometric 
analyses these will show up as the “monetary policy shocks” identified from residuals in 
structural models. 
 
Finally, McConnell and Kahn (2005) show that improved inventory control policies are also 
consistent with the finding of smaller shocks.  The intuition of their result is the same as the one 
for monetary policy.  Economic agents are doing a combination of neutralizing external shocks 
                                                 
21 Ahmed, Levin and Wilson reach their conclusion by noting that output can be written as an infinite order moving 
average.  The MA coefficients in this Wold representation correspond to a reduced form for coefficients in the 
transmission mechanism, and the innovations are simply the white noise shocks hitting the economy.  Ahmed, et. al 
show that the primary source of stabilization is the reduced magnitude of the shocks.  This result is also consistent 
with the work of Arias, Hansen and Ohanian (2004), who suggest that the reduced volatility arises from smaller 
variance of real shocks. Cecchetti, Flores-Lagunes and Krause    The Volatility of Real Growth 
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and making smaller mistakes.  Again, the result is increased stability.  More generally, the 
problem is that any improved structural flexibility not explicitly captured in a simple 
macroeconomic model will be wrongly attributed by researchers to good luck. 
 
4. Financial Development, Trade Openness,  
 Central  Bank  Structure,  and the Volatility Decline 
 
In the previous section, we focused on possible explanations for the volatility decline in the US  
The next step is to examine evidence for the panel of 25 countries.  Is it possible to explain both 
the dispersion in the level of volatility of real growth across countries as well as the change 
within countries?  To see, we look at the correlation of estimates of the standard deviation of real 
GDP growth with measures of central bank structure, financial development, commercial 
openness, and the absolute size of each country. (These measures are discussed in more detail in 
Table 4,1.)  
 
To assess the sources of changes in output volatility we use a country-specific fixed effects 
model, with the periods separated by the estimated structural breaks.   So, for a given country we 
regress the difference in the standard deviation of real growth (measured as changes in deviations 
from the HP-filtered trend), before and after the estimated volatility break date, on the change in 
the right-hand-side variables computed by the same break date.  In order to avoid problems 
associated with extreme values (see Figure 2.1), we take the log of the standard deviation of 
output innovations. 
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Table 4.1: Possible Explanations for Variation in the Volatility of Growth 
 
Financial Development and Openness to Trade  
1) Private Credit to GDP ratio: Extent to which private sector activities are financed through 
bank lending. 
2) Trade in Goods to GDP:  The ratio of imports plus exports to GDP 
 
Central Bank Structure: 
 3) Central Bank Independence: We compute an index that uses the average tenure of the central 
bank governor as a proxy for CBI as in Cukierman (1992), and de Haan and Kooi (2000). 
The turn-over ratio of the central bank governor (TOR) has the advantage that it can be 
computed for a larger set of countries and for different periods, so it becomes technically 
possible to use it to construct a measure of CBI for the periods separated by the structural 
break. 
4) Inflation Targeting: We construct the variable by dividing the number of years an inflation-
targeting regime has been in place for a particular country, by the number of years of the 
respective sub period. For the information on the dates that inflation targeting was introduced 
we employ the data from Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel (2002). 
 
Other Variables: 
5) Inflation variability:  The log of the standard deviation of inflation. 
 
The results shown in Table 4.2 are quite striking.  First, they suggest that a more developed 
financial system, measured by bank credit to the private sector, is associated with lower volatility 
in GDP growth. This outcome is consistent with the lending view: more developed financial 
markets increase the impact of a given change in monetary policy, making stabilisation efforts 
more successful. The first row of the table shows that increases in this financial development 
variable are associated with large declines in volatility, and the effects are estimated precisely (p-
values are all 0.05 or less). 
 
An example helps to reinforce the size of the estimated effects.  For the case of Korea, we 
identify a break in volatility in the first quarter of 1987.  The ratio of private Korean credit rose 
from 48 per cent of GDP before the break to 102 per cent after.  The estimates in Table 4.2 
suggest that this doubling of credit would reduce the standard deviation of Korean GDP volatility 
by between 44 per cent and 56 per cent.
22  In fact, the volatility fell by half.  From this we 
                                                 
22 The estimated impact is equal to the inverse of e raised to the power of the change in the credit to GDP ratio times 
the coefficient estimate from the first row of Table 2.1. Cecchetti, Flores-Lagunes and Krause    The Volatility of Real Growth 
 22  August 2005 
conclude that financial development has played an important role in reducing the volatility of 
output. 
 
Table 4.2: Output Volatility, Credit to the Private Sector and Trade 
(Periods determined by structural breaks) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
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p-value 
 
4) Inflation Targeting 
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5) Inflation Volatility 
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a Ratio of domestic credit extended to the private sector by banking sector to GDP. 
a Ratio of exports plus imports to GDP. 
P-values (in parentheses) are computed using standard errors that are robust to heteroskedasticity. The F-
statistics are for the joint test that all of the slope coefficients in the regression are simultaneously zero. 
 
Second, commercial openness is negatively, but not significantly, correlated with fluctuations in 
GDP growth. This result is consistent with our previous discussion: commercial openness can 
either raise or lower output volatility.  
 
Turning to the importance of monetary arrangements, we do not find evidence supporting the 
view that higher central bank independence, measured by a lower average turnover ratio of 
central bank governors, is correlated with lower output growth volatility. This outcome is 
consistent with the evidence provided by Cukierman (1992) and others. However, the results for Cecchetti, Flores-Lagunes and Krause    The Volatility of Real Growth 
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inflation volatility suggest that the higher the variance of inflation, the higher the variance of 
output.  
  
Finally the analysis suggests that adoption of an inflation-targeting scheme is correlated with 
reductions in the volatility of real growth.  One possible explanation for this is that adoption of a 
disciplined monetary policy framework helps central bankers to move the economy toward the 
efficient frontier, reducing both output and inflation volatility. The evidence suggests that this 
effect is larger than the one associated with the trade-off faced by the policymaker who, under 
optimal or near optimal policies, may only be able to reduce inflation volatility at the expense of 
increasing GDP growth fluctuations. 
 
Table 4.3: Output Volatility, Credit to the Private Sector and Trade 
(Comparison between 1970Q1-1979Q4 & 1994Q1-2003Q4) 
Explanatory  variable  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
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5) Inflation Volatility 
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a Ratio of private credit by deposit money banks to GDP. 
b Ratio of exports plus imports to GDP. 
P-values (in parentheses) are computed using standard errors that are robust to heteroskedasticity. The F-
statistics are for the joint test that all of the slope coefficients in the regression are simultaneously zero. 
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A potential criticism the results in Table 4.2 is the fact that, by employing a fixed effects model, 
we are only able to include countries for which where we have econometrically identified 
structural breaks in the volatility of real growth.  This means ignoring the information from nine 
of the 25 countries in our sample. To address this problem, and include the entire sample of 
countries, we arbitrarily break our data into sub periods and examine changes between the initial 
and final four years of the sample period common to all countries; that is, between the period 
1980Q1-1983Q4 and the one from 2000Q1 to 2003Q4. This division has the advantage that 17 
out of the 22 structural breaks fall within middle-period (1984Q1-1999Q4), suggesting that we 
have retained much of the integrity of the subdivision studied above. 
 
Table 4.3 reports these results. This alternative subdivision of the data does not affect the main 
results: financial development is negatively and significantly correlated with the standard 
deviation of growth in real GDP, while the effect of openness to trade on output volatility 
remains insignificant. The only difference is that under this subdivision of the data, neither 






While everyone who has looked agrees with the McConnell and Perez Quiros (2000) observation 
that the volatility of real growth in the United States fell by more than one-third in the mid-
1980s, there is substantial disagreement over the causes of the decline.  Is it inventory policy, 
monetary policy, or just luck? Could it be changes in financial development or possibly 
commercial openness?  The purpose of this paper is to address these questions by examining data 
from a broad set of countries to see first, whether volatility changes occurred in the rest of the 
world, and second, to provide additional evidence to assess the causes of this change. 
 
                                                 
23 We perform other robustness exercises, such as expanding the analysis to include the decade of the 1960s (data 
available for a number of countries only) and restricting the analysis to the post 1980 period and beyond. We also 
use a measure of growth volatility without applying the HP filter. Our main conclusions are robust to these 
alternative measures and definitions of time periods. Cecchetti, Flores-Lagunes and Krause    The Volatility of Real Growth 
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Our first result is that output volatility has fallen in a broad cross-section of countries; all of the 
16 countries with at least one break experienced lower volatility in the more recent period. In 
assessing the causes of the change in the volatility of real growth, our primary findings link two 
previous results. For some time we have known that more stable economies grow faster.
24  We 
have also known that a sound financial system provides the foundation for economic 
development.
25  Countries with deeper, more sophisticated, financial systems grow faster.  Our 
results show that financial development, as measured by the importance of bank lending, is 
linked to real economic stability. 
 
Beyond the importance of financial development, we also provide evidence in favor of the view 
that improved inventory control policies played a role in the more stable growth we have 
observed.  Furthermore, increased commercial openness, measured by the ratio of imports plus 
exports to GDP, does not appear to be associated with more stable growth. 
 
Finally, we should note that what we have done is established a set of correlations.  Real 
volatility is negatively correlated with bank lending and positively correlated with the 
importance of trade flows. And a significant fraction of the decline in the volatility of real GDP, 
for those countries where it fell, can be accounted for by changes in the behavior of inventory 
accumulation.  What we have not done is show causal links.  It is surely possible, for example, 
that financial systems are more prone to develop in countries that are more stable and that less 
stable countries may trade more.  Determining the ultimate causes of these changes must be high 
on the agenda for future research. 
 
Technical Appendix 
Let Δyt denote the rate of growth of HP-filtered log real GDP. We assume a simple AR(1) 
model:  
1 .     (A1) tt t yy μ φε − Δ=+ Δ +  
                                                 
24 See Ramey and Ramey (1995). 
25 See Ross Levine’s (1997) survey. Cecchetti, Flores-Lagunes and Krause    The Volatility of Real Growth 
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Our first step, for each country, is to search for multiple breaks (up to five) in the AR(1) 
coefficient, that is, persistence (φ ) in equation (A1). 
After finding any breaks in the persistence of Δyt, that model specification is used for the country 
in obtaining the residuals  ˆt ε . Then, following McConnell and Perez Quiros (2000), each set of 
residuals is assumed to follow a normal distribution and the transformations  2 ˆ || t
π ε  are 
unbiased estimators of the standard deviation of εt.
26  
Finally, we search for multiple breaks in the mean of the following volatility equation: 
 




εα =+   
 
1 1,...,      for  1,..., 1. jj tT T j m − =+ = +  
 
We search for multiple breaks in the different series above using the GAUSS code made 
available by Bai and Perron (2003) that is based on theoretical results in Bai and Perron (1998). 
The reason for considering tests for multiple breaks is that tests for a single break typically have 
low power in the presence of multiple breaks (Bai, 1997 and Bai and Perron, 2003). 
Bai and Perron (1998, 2003) present a number of tests that are available in their GAUSS 
programs. To decide on the number of breaks and the break dates we employ the “sequential” 
method described below, which is reported by Bai and Perron (2003) to outperform other 
methods, based on simulations they conduct. First, we estimate up to 5 breaks in the series for 
each country. Second, we use the method proposed by Bai and Perron (1998) based on the 
sequential application of the sup ( 1| ) T Fl l +  test, which is designed to detect the presence of 
(l+1) breaks conditional on having found l breaks (l = 0, 1,…, 5). The statistical rule is to reject l 
in favour of a model with  (1 ) l +   breaks if the overall minimal value of the sum of squared 
residuals (over all the segments where an additional break is included) is sufficiently smaller 
than the sum of squared residuals  from the model with l breaks. The dates of the breaks selected 
                                                 
26Footnote 3 of McConnell and Perez-Quiros (2000) indicates that this absolute value specification of the error is 
more robust to departures from conditional normality. See also Davidian and Carroll (1987). 
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are the ones associated with this overall minimum.
27 We identify a break (or an additional break) 






GDP data was obtained from the IMF International Financial Statistics CDROM (December 
2004) and the OECD Economic Outlook No. 76, December 2004. 
 
Data on Private credit by deposit money banks and Trade on Goods come from the World Bank 
Development Indicators, December 2004 and from the Reserve Bank of Australia. 
 
Turnover Ratio of the Central Bank Governor is constructed from information taken from each 
central bank’s website, as well as inquiries to central bank staff.  
 
Inflation Targeting:  Data are taken from Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel (2002). 
 
GDP and CPI inflation data was obtained from the IMF International Financial Statistics 
CDROM (December 2004) and the OECD Economic Outlook No. 76, December 2004. 
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